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In spite of their widespread use in policy making in the UK and elsewhere, there is a relatively sparse
literature speciﬁcally devoted to policy pilots. Recent research on policy piloting has focused on the role
of pilots in making policy work in accordance with national agendas. Taking this as a point of departure,
the present paper develops the notion of pilots doing policy work. It does this by situating piloting within
established theories of policy formulation and implementation, and illustrating using an empirical case.
Our case is drawn from a qualitative policy ethnography of a local government pilot programme aiming
to extend access to healthcare services. Our case explores the collective entrepreneurship of regional
policy makers together with local pilot volunteers. We argue that pilots work to mobilise and manage the
ambiguity and conﬂict associated with particular policy goals, and in their structure and design, shape
action towards particular outcomes. We conclude with a discussion of the generative but managed role
which piloting affords to local implementers.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Pilots and policy making
The use of public policy pilots has a history going back as far as
the 1960s in the UK (Burch and Wood, 1983) and US (Campbell,
1969). Since this time they have become a common feature of the
policy making process at national and local level in the UK. The
local pilot scheme which provides the empirical material for this
paper is a typical example of a public policy pilot; targeted funding
for a ﬁxed period to support new ways to extend access to
healthcare services across several localities in England. At the time
of writing there are two substantial national pilot schemes in
progress in England addressing similar access issues. Between them
these programmes have received in excess of £300 million, and
there are innumerable further examples across healthcare and
other public service divisions of government both locally and
nationally.
Local pilot schemes bring policy makers and evaluators into
close contact, surfacing tensions between the different andess School, Booth Street East,
S. Bailey).
Ltd. This is an open access article usometimes competing need for knowledge versus the need for ev-
idence (Mackenzie et al., 2006; Martin and Sanderson, 1999;
Sanderson, 2002). Key to the political narrative of piloting is the
principle of experimentation, as stated in an ofﬁcial report on
piloting produced in 2003; ‘the term “pilot” should ideally be
reserved for rigorous early evaluations of a policy … before that
policy has been rolled out nationally and while it is still open to
adjustment’ (Jowell, 2003, p. 11). This highlights the importance of
‘social equipoise’ (Petticrew et al., 2013) within policy pilots, the
principle of uncertainty and objectivity necessary for true experi-
mentation. This view of piloting resembles a form of trial, in which
the objective would be to ‘discover’ new objects of innovation,
which could then be diffused or disseminated elsewhere (Berwick,
2003; Greenhalgh et al., 2004). Researchers have challenged this
perspective according to the exceptional conditions of pilots (c.f.
Agamben, 2005), which shifts the narrative of experimentation
towards one of exempliﬁcation (Mackenzie et al., 2006; Martin and
Sanderson, 1999; Sanderson, 2002).
Ettelt et al. (2014) extend this analysis in their identiﬁcation of
four purposes of piloting: experimentation, implementation,
demonstration, and learning, noting the tendency for these purposes
to shift over time and for policy makers to assume that they can be
pursued in combination. They conclude that piloting should bender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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in accordance with the wishes of their political masters’ (p. 332). In
a similar vein Nair and Howlett (2015) focus on the relations of
power with which pilots are implicated, arguing that in providing
‘meaning’ to policy making, pilots are involved in ‘framing or pro-
jecting the future’ (p. 1). Given this role, the rhetorical use of
experimentation becomes a means to present a possible future in
order tomanage the conﬂict associatedwith ‘politically unpalatable
policy reforms’ (p. 4).
Seeking to develop this more critical line of enquiry, we begin
with the general standpoint that the choice of piloting on the part
of policy makers indicates a degree of ambiguity and conﬂict
around the conception and implementation of a particular policy. A
pilot, and the injection of resources that accompany it, is therefore
required to experiment, demonstrate, implement or educate (Ettelt
et al., 2014). Situating our argument within broader theories of
policy formulation and implementation, we argue that piloting
represents a form of what Harrison and Wood (1999) term
‘manipulated emergence’ in policy. This denotes a shift in policy
conception from detailed ‘blueprints’ handed down for imple-
mentation to broad ‘bright ideas’, which require translation and
adaptation, and envisages an active but managed role for local
implementers in making policy work ‘on the ground’. Following
Kingdon (1984) we conceive of this work as a local and collective
form of policy entrepreneurship. We use our empirical case to show
how this entrepreneurial action combines with the design and
structure of policy pilots in order to shape particular outcomes. We
argue that this affords a constructive and generative role to those
‘implementing’ policy, and discuss the implications of this for
policy and research.
Our analysis is situated in English health policy post-2010, in
which, building upon a governmental agenda of localism (Lowndes
and Pratchett, 2012), devolution and ‘super-austerity’ (Lowndes
and Gardner, 2016), local policy piloting has perhaps gone further
than in other countries. However, understanding the contextual
conditions that facilitate this approach to policy implementation, as
well as the problems that may arise, is important for those in other
systems facing the same demographic and ﬁnancial pressures fac-
ing the English National Health Service (NHS). In addition, our use
of established theoretical frameworks to situate our case increases
the generalisability of our ﬁndings beyond our local context,
allowing us to describe a set of mechanisms which we would
expect to be common features of the piloting process.
This paper draws on the recent experience of evaluating a pilot
programme established in 2013, which aimed to extend access to
healthcare services. Our broad interest is in how local imple-
mentation feeds back into policy formulation, and with what
consequences. We argue that the policy work of piloting takes us
beyond what might be commonly understood to be the discre-
tionary role of implementation at ‘street-level’ (Lipsky, 1980), to a
more creative and generative role for those ‘implementing’ policy.
We begin by situating this generative role within broader theories
of policy making.
2. Policy formulation and implementation
In contrast to rational-objective accounts of policy making,
Kingdon's (1984) multiple streams approach proposes an under-
standing of policy making as made up of ambiguous and conﬂicted
sets of processes. He argues that policy agendas are shaped by ac-
tivities related to three distinct ‘streams’: the ‘problem’, ‘policy’ and
‘politics’ streams. The problem stream is concerned with how
particular phenomena become conceptualised as problems
requiring policy attention, the policy stream is concerned with the
development of policy initiatives and the politics stream isconcerned with the balancing of different interests, such as party
political interests and lobby groups. Kingdon argues that conﬂu-
ence between these three streams results in the policy ‘window’
being opened and change becoming possible, and emphasises the
role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (PEs) in helping to create such win-
dows. Hence the policy that ‘gets made’ is only one set of ar-
rangements among many possibilities, and opportunism in the
coupling of the three streams plays a substantial part in selecting
out of what he calls the ‘soup’ of ideas and agendas.
It follows from this that entrepreneurialism in policy arenas is
an inherently collective activity; made possible by the conﬂuence of
multiple layers of concerns, crossing different communities, and
possibly stretching over considerable periods of time. This point is
picked up in much of the wider literature on policy entrepreneurs
that has followed Kingdon's (1984) concept, which notes the
important role of PEs in building and maintaining networks and
coalitions of interest (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996;
Roberts and King, 1991). However, there is a strong emphasis on
the individual attributes of PEs, as Kingdon (1984) states: ‘their
deﬁning characteristic … is their willingness to invest their re-
sources e time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money e in the
hope of a future return’ (p. 122). This produces a heroic account of
policy entrepreneurialism, which some argue does not grasp the
‘embedded’ nature of institutional agency (Garud et al., 2007). The
PE literature is therefore marked by a relative lack of emphasis
upon the institutional structures and relations that make entre-
preneurship possible (Catney and Henneberry, 2015). This is
perhaps in part due to Kingdon's focus on policy making at the US
federal level, and the consequent focus in much of the PE literature
on political elites (Arnold, 2013). In order to make sense of more
local entrepreneurial action, it is therefore ﬁrst of all necessary to
bring Kingdon's (1984) framework down to the regional and local
level of governance.
Exworthy and Powell (2004) extend Kingdon's (1984) frame-
work to expand on the role of local advocates in pushing ideas onto
the policy agenda via ‘local windows’. They adopt Kingdon's (1984)
policy stream, and add two further streams relevant to local
implementation:
1. Process stream, concerned with causal technical and political
feasibility
2. Resource stream, concerned with ﬁnancial resources but also
with human resources, power and ownership (Exworthy and
Powell, 2004, pp. 265e266)
Exworthy and Powell (2004) suggest therefore that local PEs can
mobilise networks to shape local agendas, potentially opening
‘little windows’ which can achieve a broader inﬂuence, ‘galvanizing
action’ (p. 277) in the context of the multiple and conﬂicting
coexistence of ideas and agendas in the national policy ‘soup’.
Expanding on the role of local PEs, more recent research has
proposed the concept of the ‘street-level policy entrepreneur’
(SLPE) (Arnold, 2013; Oborn et al., 2011; Petchey et al., 2007). While
the ‘street-level bureaucrat’, in Lipsky's (1980) formulation, creates
a limited discretionary space for frontline workers to move within
policy frames imposed upon them, the SLPE plays amore active and
creative role in changing those policy frames, not only in opening
local windows, but in yoking ‘together a network to make policy
agendas happen’ (Oborn et al., 2011, p. 325).
This challenges the implicit dualism between policy makers and
recipients commonly assumed in the implementation literature
(McDermott et al., 2013). Matland's (1995) theory of implementa-
tion, for example, attempts to synthesize ‘top down’ and ‘bottom
up’ perspectives on policy implementation, arguing that degrees of
conﬂict and ambiguity attending particular policy agendas deﬁne
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useful framework for mapping the relationship between policy
formulation and implementation, potentially affording contextual
conditions an autonomous and adaptive role, he nevertheless re-
tains the sense in which policies are devised centrally and reacted
to locally, which the concept of the SLPE seeks to displace.
McDermott et al. (2013) argue that the distinction of policy
makers and recipients overlooks the political dimensions of
implementation processes, suggesting instead that entrepreneurial
activity can have an additive or extrapreneurial role. However they
emphasise that such activity can only be understood as a form of
situated or ‘contextualised change agency’, requiring actors at
different levels of government to ‘gain support and resourcing for
change’ (p. S111).
3. The political context: localism, decentralisation and
devolution
The political context to the programme that features in this
analysis can be characterised according to three linked agendas
beginning in 2010: localism, decentralisation and devolution of
public services. These agendas have their roots in the principles of
‘new governance’ (Rhodes, 1996) and ‘new public management’
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994), indicated by a shift away from hierar-
chy towards market and network forms of governance.
In healthcare, marketisation began in earnest with the intro-
duction of the internal market in 1991, which split purchasers from
providers and introduced competition between providers. The New
Labour government came to power in 1997 and sought to temper
competition, while at the same time introducing a centralised and
top-down performance regime. When the Coalition government
came to power in 2010, they quickly sought to reintroduce
competition, under a banner of ‘liberation’ (Department of Health,
2010). The Health and Social Care Act (2012 HSCA) provides the
current legislative framework for a more decentralised health ser-
vice, opening the door further than ever before to commercial ac-
tivities among public sector providers and to increasing
privatisation. However, published only two years later, NHS
England's (2014) ‘Five Year Forward View’ appeared in direct
contrast to the HSCA, envisaging locality based commissioning of
services to regional providers who form coalitions rather than
compete and work closely with commissioners of care to design
services. The contradictions between these two sets of policies of-
fers an indication of the turbulent and uncertain nature of
contemporary health service organisation in England.
Bringing our attention down to the local level, The Coalition
White Paper, Liberating the NHS had proposed the abolition of
managerially-dominated regional and local bodies previously
charged with commissioning care (Strategic Health Authorities and
Primary Care Trusts) and their replacement with general practi-
tioner (GP) led commissioning through Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCGs), which became the statutory bodies responsible for
commissioning secondary and community care for their patients:
The Government will liberate the NHS from excessive bureaucratic
and political control, and make it easier for professionals to do the
right things for and with patients, to innovate and improve out-
comes. (Department of Health (2010), p. 9).
There were few central requirements informing the establish-
ment of CCGs, and their creation was described in terms of local
ﬂexibility and clinical leadership. In the language of ‘freedom’ and
‘innovation’ can be found the direct appeal of the government to
those at ‘street-level’, as stated by the health secretary at the time:
‘The purpose of the proposed reforms is to give you and yourcolleagues in general practice e as people who see patients every
day and best understand their needs e the responsibility to shape
services to deliver the high-quality care patients expect and
deserve’ (Lansley, 2010).
In structural terms the HSCA established a national body NHS
England (NHSE) with responsibility for running the NHS under a
mandate from the Department of Health. NHSE was established
with a national board and 27 regional teams (RTs) intended to act as
‘outposts’ to the central organisation rather than as autonomous
bodies (Department of Health, 2010). However, after the HSCA
came into law there was a brief window inwhich NHSE had not yet
fully established a national way of doing things, and the RTs had
some budget with which to innovate. The RT that features in this
paper seized this opportunity to introduce a pilot programme, with
the goal of ‘extending access to healthcare’.
We argue that this opportunism on the part of the RT had the
effect of opening the ‘little’ policy window, appearing to create
some space in which local entrepreneurs could try ideas out in
practice. We will begin by describing the launch of the programme
before moving on to present our ﬁndings.
4. The programme and the evaluation
The RT that features in this paper is responsible for a demo-
graphically diverse urban area in England. The RT sent a brief to all
general practices in the area inviting proposals of up to £500,000
each for a six-month pilot programme. The brief was short, speci-
fying only a deﬁned population size and a focus on improving ac-
cess to care; a policy goal open to various interpretations (e.g. Boyle
et al., 2010). The brief also emphasised the importance of sup-
porting service integration and the use of technology. No other
objectives or expectations were provided. Sites had two weeks to
submit proposals, and once funded had four weeks to ‘go live’. Out
of eighteen bids received, six were successful, initially each
receiving funds of between £50,000 and £500,000. However, after
the scheme had been live for approximately 3months, the available
time was extended to one year, and budgets were also increased
proportionately.
This paper is based on data collected as part of a mixed
methods research study, combining a qualitative ‘policy ethnog-
raphy’ (Dubois, 2009; Stevens, 2010) with a quantitative analysis
of activity and outcomes data. This paper draws exclusively on the
qualitative data. The qualitative research was a closely applied
form of policy ethnography, a participatory and community-based
approach, combining interviews with observation and documen-
tary analysis, and driven by an interpretivist interest in the pro-
duction of policy meanings at the time and place of
implementation (Yanow, 1996). This sought to combine the
pragmatic need for detailed data in ‘real time’ concerning prob-
lems encountered and solutions developed by pilot sites, with the
desire to generate more generalisable ideas about the contribution
of pilots to the implementation of policy and the process of
organisational change in the public sector. As such, our research
interests in policy making were combined with developmental
‘policy work’ (Brown et al., 2010) with the participants in the
programme. Data collected during the programme were commu-
nicated back to pilot sites through quarterly learning sessions
comprised of presentations and discussion involving all pilot sites,
as well as the RT and representatives of the wider health economy
in each area.
The political context of the research, as well as the early and
experimental nature of implementation in each site presented a
challenge to the elicitation of open accounts of progress and chal-
lenges encountered, both in recorded interviews and learning
sessions. As in many ethnographic settings, many meetings were
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speech directly, this included the learning sessions and all meetings
involving members of the RT. The data collected was therefore a
mixture of recorded, semi- or unstructured interviews (n ¼ 72),
ﬁeldnotes from meetings, and a substantial amount of ‘unofﬁcial’
notes and reﬂections based on those times when recording had not
been possible, and which were shared and discussed among the
qualitative research team in the interests of building a richly con-
textualised picture of each site. This mixed characterisation of the
data set is reﬂected in the ﬁndings presented here, in which the
narrative is built upon a detailed contextual knowledge, with
interviewee accounts used illustratively where appropriate. Based
on the situated perspectives of a relatively small number of actors,
we do not claim that our data is representative of policy pilots and
their participants elsewhere, however, our detailed and real-time
data offer us an opportunity to ‘improvise’ theory (Cerwonka and
Malkki, 2007) about the key role that local actors can play in the
formulation and implementation of policy. This role is one made
possible by a particular set of institutional conditions, but also upon
mechanisms we believe to be common to the design and imple-
mentation of policy pilots themselves, which drives our focus on
the ‘policy work’ of piloting.
The analysis proceeded in three stages. In stage one, a total of 72
transcripts of formal interviews were subject to primary and sec-
ondary analysis by the qualitative research team (QRT) and con-
ducted using qualitative datamanagement software (Nvivo 10). The
coding framework established was initially designed to be open
and ﬂexible and based on broad categories derived from primary
content analysis of the data; ‘policy’, ‘enablers’, ‘context’, ‘pilots’,
‘open codes’ and ‘lists’. An initial set of sub categories was devel-
oped by the QRT from analysis of three transcripts. Three members
of the QRT [initials removed for review] then coded the data using
the framework, adding codes where necessary and discussing with
wider QRT at regular intervals.
In stage two thematic analysis established a wider framework
that consisted of 60 separate codes, inwhich each code represented
a single theme or topic discussed during interview. These codes
were then grouped according to the broader categories ﬁrst
identiﬁed.
Stage three involved all members of the QRT collectively dis-
cussing the broader signiﬁcance of the data to identify areas to
explore in more detail through further data analysis in combination
with research literature. The present paper developed out of the
data related to pilots and policy, in combination with broader
theories of policy formulation and implementation.5. Findings
Our empirical data are organised around four themes. In the ﬁrst
sectionwewill demonstrate the opening of the little window in the
manner in which the sites were established, and volunteers
encouraged to participate. This illustrates the enterprising role of
the RT, in establishing a coalition of interests. We will then present
ﬁndings organised according to policy, process and resource
streams (Exworthy and Powell, 2004). In the policy stream, we
describe the RT's permissive but managed approach to churning
the ‘soup’ of policy ideas, in the process stream, we describe how
the pilot imposed a technical rationality upon each site, pushing
them away from experimentation towards demonstration; in the
resource stream we describe the transformation of the short term
and intense ﬁnancial and human capital associated with the pilot
into increased political capital.6. Opening the little window
In a meeting between the RT and the pilot sites at the launch of
the programme, the RT manager responsible for the programme
explained his/her vision: to put access to care ‘on the map’ and
‘show that we are open for business’. S/he spoke of the deliberate
use of an open brief and a short timescale to encourage creativity
and challenge the ‘usual bureaucracy’ which could inhibit innova-
tion. This appeared to work as an incentive for particular in-
dividuals, who had the networks to mobilise quickly and ideas for
service development. Importantly, the invitation to submit bids
went directly to both individual providers and commissioners. This
led to some variation in the extent of commissioner involvement,
and a perception by some that they had been bypassed or were
unable to exert meaningful control. The following extract is from a
Director of Commissioning:
My role with [pilot lead] was to say to him… because I met him
and he put a bid in front of me and said, “we don't take that
anywhere else”… So I read it and said: “That's interesting. That
will never work. That's really good.” I read through on that basis
with him and then I suggested a couple of other things to him…
that was my role with [pilot lead] because he's such a self-
starter. He simply gets on the phone to his Chief Exec and
says, [name of CEO], make this happen for me by this date, so
he's got no need for a mere Director to get involved. (Director of
Commissioning, Site D&E)
The image of the ‘self-starter’ in the above excerpt chimes with
the idea of local policy entrepreneurs: individuals who have the
relational resources and the personal belief to be drivers of local
policy implementation. The opening of the little windows requires
such individuals to feel they are mobilising their own creative
resources:
we put the project together, we get it approved, we get the
funding, yeah great, and we do more than what we're expected
to do because we enjoy it, you know, and it's our baby and we
want to see new ways of working and essentially, it's a blank
piece of paper where I can create what I want to create and that
always is an incentive to, kind of, go beyond the bar (Lead GP,
Site E)
Given the very short timescale, these individuals needed project
proposals that were ready to go, and could be ‘hooked onto’ the
brief. As the following excerpt suggests, this could be a somewhat
ad hoc process, leading to bids that were a mixture of different
stakeholder interests:
So when [pilot] bids were ﬁrst advertised… I suggested that we
did something using stuff that we'd done previously, which was
allowing other people to access care records. So we'd done
something two or three years ago with the PCT where we had a
seconded person using our records, and we think we produced
quite good evidence to show that it was cost effective … but it
didn't get taken forward. So I said, look, why can't we do
something like that, it ﬁts with innovation, it ﬁts with integra-
tion, why can't we do something like that. So I put that forward
as a bid … And then somewhere along the line, I think some-
body else said, why don't we use videoconferencing… to allow
this to happen? I'm not sure what process that happened by…
So the bid, therefore, became, I think, an amalgamation of those
two things (GP, Site A)
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tunistically, as a chance to develop existing interests, and ‘hook’
these onto the brief.
As we have already noted, the launch of the programme
occurred during a moment of freedom for the RT created by the
scale and pace of national legislative change. They were also able to
present themselves as somewhat ‘rogue’, challenging bureaucracy
and inviting volunteers to help them ‘go their ownway’. Therefore,
the work of the local entrepreneurs was initially instigated and
made possible via the enterprising work of the RT. It is equally
important to note, however, that the policy objectives the RT chose
were already present in the national policy ‘soup’.7. Policy stream
The overarching objective of the programme was to extend ac-
cess to healthcare, and support integration and the use of tech-
nology. As a result of this broad invitation, a wide variety of
understandings of access, and of the means of operationalising and
measuring it, were present in the proposals of the successful sites.
Whilst the speed with which the sites were asked to implement
service changes might have contributed to the successful incen-
tivisation of particular individuals to take part, it also created
challenges to all sites in putting their proposals into action. Site
proposals were initially ambitious, in some cases combining many
different objectives. Over the ﬁrst fewweeks of the programme, the
sites tended to narrow their scope to one or two services, to which
themajority of resources were then directed. This was driven by the
need to show ‘measurable’ evidence of pilot activities within a
limited time-frame. It in turn drove a narrowing of the policy
agenda, in which those services targeting Accident & Emergency
(A&E) activity came to dominate the attention of the RT, and, by
extension, the attention of the pilot sites. The need for measurable
impact was increasingly harnessed to service the agenda of shifting
activity away from acute trusts, with those not achieving this
feeling under some pressure:
We think the outcomes are excellent, qualitative wise I think
[we] had a good impact on the lives of those people. You've done
everything [for patients] from ﬁlling in forms for correct, you
know, funding that they've struggled with before and couldn't
do, to supplying equipment, to giving advice about falls, to social
isolation. Absolute everything … What we're probably not
achieving is the evidence of deﬂecting people from A&E.
(Occupational Therapist, Site D)
The overall effect of the programme on the policy stream
therefore was to shape the emergence of ‘timely access’ (Boyle
et al., 2010) as the dominant understanding of ‘better’ access, and
to focus the attention of a number of the sites almost exclusively on
providing extra hours in primary care. This created problems for the
sites who were promoting alternative conceptions of access:
In terms of access, when we go to the [RT] meetings, it's very
clear that a lot of the [pilots] have a view on access, which is
around eight 'til eight [opening] and extended GP cover. And
we're at pains to state, and have been since the outset, that's not
a feature for us. We see access improvement as being via
different ways of working … It's not that whole thing about
more hours gives you better access, because we don't believe it
does…You couldn't staff it and you probably couldn't afford it if
you scale it up. And what we're trying to do is look at alternative
models (Director of Commissioning, Site F)While recognising the dominant agenda, and their own position
outside it, the above quote indicates a sustained resistance on the
part of this site. This had important effects which will be discussed
further below. What is also indicated here is tension within the
programme between the objectives of ‘experimenting’ and
‘demonstrating’ (c.f. Ettelt et al., 2014); if the core agenda was al-
ways to reduce attendance at A&E by extending opening hours in
primary care, then the spirit of experimentation appears rhetorical.
This interpretation is challenged by the fact that various diverse
schemes were funded, not all of which had extended hours at their
core. Rather, it seems, the RT were deliberately permissive at the
outset, funding proposals which sought to address a range of
different access problems. As the programme progressed, the focus
shifted from ‘experimentation’ to ‘demonstrating measurable re-
sults’. In parallel a narrower and more clearly formed policy object
of ‘access as extended hours’ emerged, with a concurrent reduction
in ambiguity associated with the goal. The consequences of this
shift were then played out through the process stream.
8. Process stream
The process stream concerns the technical feasibility of imple-
menting a set of policy ideas. As noted above, the policy idea was
initially stated in a loose and broad manner by the RT, generating a
range of responses in the sites. Through the policy stream a nar-
rower set of concerns emerged as themain goals of the programme,
which in retrospect makes the RT's permissiveness seem managed.
However, that sense of permissiveness was key not only to the goals
but to the means by which they might be achieved:
So the pilot enabled them to go with the gut feel and then
produce the evidence to say ‘oh, I think we've got this wrong’.
And got it wrong together, not in blaming one another. It was got
it wrong together really … And it's not set in stone. We can
change this. This is about proving concept. They like that. So I
think this has given the ﬂexibility to do that (Director& Co Lead,
Site B)
This quote demonstrates the close connection between the
streams, in this case the policy and process streams working
together, the former representing the broad objective, the latter
representing the ﬁtting of the objective to practice. There is the
sense here that the idea itself is open to change as implementation
proceeds via trial and error. However, as noted above the pilot
process imposes a fundamental limit upon trial and error with the
need to eventually try something that can be shown to work.
Accordingly, with an increasingly ﬁxed idea of desired outcomes,
the sites e at least those aiming to provide extended hours e
became focussed on the best means to achieve that outcome. In this
way technical feasibility led to the dominance of demonstration
over experimentation. Within the programme, when extended
hours emerged as the core aim (at least for some sites), the tech-
nical question of how to provide this centred on problems of
technology and governance, in enabling groups of providers to
share patient records with one another. A range of solutions were
developed, through which these sites were eventually able to
provide the additional service. However, the solutions themselves
often relied on complicated ad hoc ‘workarounds’, solving imme-
diate technical challenges, but in a way which could not be sus-
tained in the long term. Ignoring such costs, the achievement of the
goal of extended hours in the associated sites was in itself taken as a
sign of great success. Approximately six months into the twelve
month programme the sites offering extended hours were all
operational, and with a high degree of parity in their processes, via
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through the programme. Combined with the policy stream, the
pilot had shaped the emergence of an unambiguous policy goal,
with a relatively unconﬂicted set of processes for its achievement.
In the process stream a logic is enacted whereby an idea is
evaluated according to its technical feasibility e if it can be made to
work then it becomes, by deﬁnition, a good idea. However, this can
render the resources required to achieve it somewhat invisible, as
will be discussed below.9. Part 4: Resource stream
A number of different kinds of resourcewill be considered under
this stream e most obviously, ﬁnancial, but also how ﬁnance
combines with human resources, which through the pilot can be
transformed into resources of power.
Pilot programmes are, by deﬁnition, temporary arrangements,
involving an injection of resources which need to be spent whilst
also demonstrating some kind of impact. This creates a potential
problem for the sustainability of piloted policies, with the spread of
the policy rarely matching the investment of the pilot (Sanderson,
2002). In our case, the RT eventually spent just over £4 million on
the programme, with the most expensive site costing over £1
million. This represents a substantial local investment, particularly
in the context of a national austerity programme involving deep
cuts to public spending. This resource intensity was exacerbated in
this case by the very short timescales:
I think… the lead in time, wasn't sufﬁcient really… any major
project like this, you would have expected a much bigger
planning stage for us to actually look at the logistics and make
sure all these things were looked at … Whereas it worked,
because we all worked together, but a lot of it was done on the
hoof, so to speak. Where really, we could have had a bit more
forward planning… I think it would have been better. (Manager,
Site B)
This quote speaks to the attempt to temporarily suspend ‘the
ordinary state of things’ in pilots, and to the often imperfect de-
cisions which result. Importantly, this temporary suspension
means that the conditions experienced in pilots may be a poor
representation of the conditions under which the policy might be
fully implemented:
Project management is essential. Again, we underestimated that
… but we've managed … I think sometimes that lack of un-
derstanding of scaling up, what it means that you've actually got
to communicate with people. We can do it on a small scale with
7000 patients and 12 members of staff, but for 34,000? (GP, Site
B Co-lead)
Here, the question of whether or not this pilot represents a real
test of what it might be like to implement a particular set of ideas in
full, becomes obscured by the need to just make it work in the time
allotted e to just ‘manage’. This once again raises the question of
sustainability, a point returned to below. Our interest ﬁrst is in the
consequences of this shifting of ﬁnancial and human resources so
as to generate change and re-shape broader agendas. The following
excerpts link back to the data presented in the opening of the little
window, in which volunteers were drawn by the offer of ‘carte
blanche’ to redesign services. While ﬁnancial resources and oper-
ational discretion were afforded to site leads, the successful
implementation of new services inevitably required participation
from others in the local health economy, where the ‘usual’ rules andconventions could not always be easily suspended:
There is a problemwith ﬁnance, and the ﬁnance team's problem
is that if we're paying a seven day tariff and they're discharging
at day ﬁve, the next patient that's going in, whether they be
acutely ill or not, we're having to pay that tariff sooner. So there's
a cost implication to the CCG. I recognise it, but I can't allow that
to be a hindrance to me not developing the model. When I met
[ﬁnance director, CCG] that's the point I put across to him, that I
can do this and I can prove that a lot of patients could be dis-
charged early. What you lot need to do at a national level is re-
look at the tariff system and say it's not working (GP& Lead, Site
D)
Here, the pilot lead expressed frustration that the good work of
the intervention (i.e. early discharge) was offset by the usual rules
of the system which penalised CCGs for this, impeding his/her
ability to demonstrate ﬁnancial beneﬁts. This demonstrates the
challenge facing the local entrepreneur. Within a time limited pilot
it is highly unlikely that system change (such as change to national
tariffs) will occur, requiring entrepreneurial work to induce other
parties into collaboration in the experiment. Thus, the experiment
works according to the suspension of the ordinary, but the success
of this strategy relies on convincing others that this suspension also
applies to them e that it is an opportunity to think and do
differently:
Well, interestingly enough, [pilot site] is obviously one sector of
[borough name] and you talk about driving change, or changing
mindset, it's had a massive impact on the three other sectors
already. An opportunity, whatever you want to see it as, it's
created quite a bit of noise in the system, all positive, real pos-
itive, no negative. (Director & Co-LeadSite B)
In the short term life of the programme therefore, the success of
each entrepreneur depended on their ability to ‘sell’ the opportu-
nity. However, once the pilot ended and resources ran out, local
system leaders (the CCGs) themselves decided whether or not to
continue to invest in the pilot services. This decision was compli-
cated by the fact that the mobilisation of resources through the
programme generated pockets of intense activity which created
local political pressure for these services to be sustained, thereby
enhancing the effective authority of the RT. The position of the RT
was further enhanced when this intense activity produced modest
success against their key indicator.10. Discussion
Our case has shown how policy makers at the regional level
were able to capitalise on structural turbulence and uncertainty, to
open a little policy window. Directing resources towards this
window, they encouraged local volunteers to mobilise their own
resources around a loose set of ‘bright ideas’ about extending access
to healthcare. The work of the local entrepreneurs within the three
local streams shaped the emergence of a particular policy goal and
provided the RT with the effective authority to take a more direc-
tive approach to spreading the policy further. This was accom-
plished by different kinds of work going on in each stream. In the
policy stream, the vague and permissive approach of the RT shaped
the emergence of ‘reduction in A&E activity’ as the key policy
outcome and ‘extended hours’ as the instrument for its achieve-
ment, thus reducing the ambiguity of goals. In the process stream,
experimentation led a trial and error approach which became
progressively limited by a technical rationality of what could be
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In the resource stream an intense injection of ﬁnancial and human
resource produced modest success against a key indicator, with
questions remaining over the sustainability of arrangements. When
in the immediate aftermath of the pilot the RT successfully incor-
porated access to healthcare in the regional policy agenda;
‘extended hours’ became an implementation priority across the
region, but with only around half the per capita resources provided
to the pilot allocated to the spread of the policies. This immediately
compounded the distribution of resources that are an essential
short-term feature of pilots, and transformed the ‘successful’ pilot
sites into ‘early adopters’ and the non-conformists into varying
degrees of ‘laggard’ (Rogers, 1995). While sustainability is a well-
known problem in piloting and change management
literature more broadly (e.g. Buchanan et al., 2005), our case
prompts a concern with the long term effects of policy made ac-
cording to a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005).
Harrison and Wood's (1999) concept of ‘manipulated emer-
gence’ appears through this analysis to provide an effective strategy
within the contemporary policy landscape where local organisa-
tions lack effective authority. The effectiveness of this approach
required opportunism and a degree of risk taking on the part of the
RT here. It also required local entrepreneurs to believe that they
were being given permission to use the ﬁnancial and human re-
sources at their disposal in an autonomous and creative manner.
Both the permissiveness and the creativity were tempered by the
technical rationality initiated in the process stream, in which ‘what
works’ shifted to ‘what could be made to work’ within the time
available. This represents an essential problem for policy piloting,
which requires a suspension of the ordinary to create the necessary
‘slack’ to do something novel. When complexity is encountered
then exceptional arrangements or working practices become
necessary to ﬁnd solutions. The process is deemed successful if a
policy object and the means to achieve it emerge. However, by
deﬁnition pilots end e but the objects they fashion live on in order
to be spread, detached from the exceptional conditions of their
emergence.
This connects to the emphasis we have placed upon the col-
lective and conditional nature of local entrepreneurship. Our study
joins a recent stream of literature on the local or ‘street level’ policy
entrepreneur (Arnold, 2013; Oborn et al., 2011; Petchey et al.,
2007). Lipsky's (1980) ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (SLBs), through
the day-to-day doings of their jobs, stood in the way of reform. This
concept keeps policy makers and recipients distinct, with SLBs
ﬁgured as practising within a set of unchangeable limits. The
concept of the SLPE proposes that such limits can be at least
temporarily transgressed. We have tried to make clear the struc-
tural conditions at the national and regional level which made this
transgression possible in our case. The more ‘local’ the entrepre-
neur, the more one might expect external forces to shape the limits
of their entrepreneurial action. This results in a tension regarding
the use of the ‘street-level’ concept, which further research is
required to unpick: the essential feature of Lipsky's (1980) SLB's
was their position at the front-line, and their operation of discre-
tionwithin existing frames at this ‘street-level’. In our analysis, as in
the work of both Oborn et al. (2011) and Petchey et al. (2007), the
entrepreneurial activity takes the SLPE away from the ‘street-level’,
and does not then directly affect the discretionary space at the
street-level. The SLPE aspires to something more transformative
than the incremental adjustments that Lipsky (1980) described.
However, fusing the SLPE to the concept of ‘manipulated emer-
gence’, as we have done here, suggests that the cumulative results
of this entrepreneurial work might be a hardening of the frames
within which street-level workers operate. This suggests that the
concept of the SLPE represents a kind of manipulative response onthe part of policy makers to the ‘problem’ of the discretion of the
SLB. Further work is therefore needed on the activities of SLPEs and
their consequences.
11. Conclusion
Recent developments in the literature on policy piloting have
drawn attention to their productive effects in ‘projecting the future’
(Nair and Howlett, 2015) and ‘making policy work’ (Ettelt et al.,
2014). We develop these ideas through an analysis of the policy
work of piloting which is grounded in broader theories of policy
formulation and implementation, and situated within the
contemporary local political agenda of decentralisation.
Our contribution has been to describe how the policy work of
piloting is enacted. We argue that this occurs through the collective
entrepreneurial work of actors enabled and shaped by the ratio-
nalities imposed by the structure and design of pilots. We conceive
of pilots as coalitions of advocates, through which policy ideas are
objectiﬁed and detached from the exceptional circumstances of
their emergence. We have demonstrated this action through four
stages in our case. In the ﬁrst, the regional policy makers opened
the little window, opportunistically mobilising ﬁnancial resources
in order to establish a coalition of interests. In the second, the policy
stream involved local entrepreneurs in creatively churning the
policy ‘soup’, developing possible objects of innovation. In the third,
the process stream, the soup was clariﬁed according to a technical
rationality which effected the shift from experimentation to
demonstration. Lastly, in the resource stream, the ﬁnancial and
human resources committed to the pilot combined with this
technical rationality to make the policy work. This transformed the
RT's original ‘stake’ into increased authority and inﬂuence on the
regional policy agenda.
The collective and conditional understanding of entrepreneurial
pilot work contributes to recent work on local entrepreneurial ac-
tivity as a form of ‘contextualised change agency’ (McDermott et al.,
2013) and networks of SLPEs ‘making policy agendas happen’
(Oborn et al., 2011). We develop these ideas by showing how the
activity of the SLPE is only made possible by the opening of little
windows by regional policy makers. The agency of the SLPE is then
at once enabled and constrained by the mechanisms of the pilot
itself, offering freedom of expression tempered by technical ratio-
nality and the need to demonstrate outcomes. Our analysis there-
fore provides an in depth exploration of how the effect described as
‘manipulated emergence’ (Harrison and Wood, 1999) is enacted at
the meso andmicro level. Accordingly, freedom at the front line is a
device that is used in the successful enaction of a pilot scheme.
However, if this success also works to churn the national policy
soup e as we have argued in our case e then this can result in the
emergence of policy agendas, objects and instruments that might
result in the future restriction of freedoms for frontline workers,
who will then be in further need of liberation in order to explore
and innovate.
While the effects of the pilot success in our case are still being
played out, we believe further research is required on the conse-
quences of ‘successful’ piloting for the manner in which policy is
made and the expectations that are created as a result. While the
problems of sustainability associated with pilot schemes are well
known, the broader consequences of their exceptionalism deserve
more attention.
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